Santa Clara High Technology Law Journal
Volume 38

Issue 1

Article 2

2021

SHOULD PERSONAL INFORMATION AND BIOMETRIC DATA BE
PROTECTED UNDER A COMPREHENSIVE FEDERAL PRIVACY
STATUTE THAT USES THE CALIFORNIA CONSUMER PRIVACY
ACT AND THE ILLINOIS BIOMETRIC INFORMATION PRIVACY ACT
AS MODEL LAWS?
Buresh, Donald L.

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.scu.edu/chtlj
Part of the Intellectual Property Law Commons, and the Science and Technology Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Buresh, Donald L., SHOULD PERSONAL INFORMATION AND BIOMETRIC DATA BE PROTECTED UNDER A
COMPREHENSIVE FEDERAL PRIVACY STATUTE THAT USES THE CALIFORNIA CONSUMER PRIVACY ACT
AND THE ILLINOIS BIOMETRIC INFORMATION PRIVACY ACT AS MODEL LAWS?, 38 SANTA CLARA HIGH
TECH. L.J. 39 (2021).
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.scu.edu/chtlj/vol38/iss1/2

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at Santa Clara Law Digital Commons. It has
been accepted for inclusion in Santa Clara High Technology Law Journal by an authorized editor of Santa Clara
Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact sculawlibrarian@gmail.com.

SHOULD PERSONAL INFORMATION AND BIOMETRIC DATA BE
PROTECTED UNDER A COMPREHENSIVE FEDERAL PRIVACY
STATUTE THAT USES THE CALIFORNIA CONSUMER PRIVACY ACT
AND THE ILLINOIS BIOMETRIC INFORMATION PRIVACY ACT AS
MODEL LAWS?
By Donald L. Buresh1
The issue addressed in this paper was that only a minority of
states have passed privacy and biometric privacy rights laws. The
collection, storage, use, and dissemination of personal information and
biometric data is becoming paramount due to the public’s everincreasing desire for security. The purpose of this study was to
understand and evaluate the privacy and property issues that states
confront that are inherent within the use and results of employing
personal information and biometric data to enhance corporate security
in their efforts to protect individual privacy. This research addressed
the following questions: (1) What are the biometric privacy issues that
states face regarding individual and corporate needs for security and
privacy?; (2) Why do the several states continue to be vulnerable to
litigation regarding biometric privacy issues?; (3) How does the State
of Illinois address biometric privacy issues in its statutory effort to
protect individuals against organizations that employ biometric
cybersecurity procedures?; and (4) How does the Illinois Biometric
Information Privacy Act benefit the federal government and other
states in their efforts to create and pass biometric privacy laws that
1
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protect the privacy rights of their citizens? Four key findings are
discussed in this study. The major finding was that neither the
California Consumer Privacy Act as amended, the California Privacy
Right Act nor Illinois’ Biometric Information Privacy Act overlap to
form a far-reaching privacy law because the subject matters of both
laws are different. The recommendations argue that the United States
needs an all-inclusive privacy law that encompasses both personal
information and biometric information.
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INTRODUCTION
The privacy rights regarding the collection, use, storage, and
dissemination of individual biometric data are in flux. Illinois, Texas,
and Washington have passed biometric privacy laws within the last 20
years. Two states that are evaluating biometric privacy bills before their
respective legislatures are Maryland and New York. The issue is that
only a tiny minority of states recognize biometric privacy rights. The
collection, storage, use, and dissemination of biometric data is
becoming paramount due to the public’s ever-increasing desire for
security. How both federal and state governments respond to this
craving for security concerning individual biometric data is an open
question. Thus, this section aims to introduce privacy law in general,
biometric privacy law, and what biometric information is and what it
is not.
The purpose of this essay is to understand and evaluate the
privacy and property issues that States confront that are inherent within
the use and results of using biometrics to enhance corporate security in
their efforts to protect individual privacy. This paper examines the
Supreme Court cases that deal with an individual’s right to privacy as
well as several cases involving Illinois’ Biometric Information Privacy
Act (BIPA). It also discusses the recent American approaches to
privacy and compares these approaches to how privacy is addressed in
the European Union. The three states that have passed biometric
security legislation into law are Illinois, Texas, and Washington. The
Maryland and New York legislatures are debating similar bills. In
conjunction with a brief description of the Texas and Washington
biometric laws, the study examines Illinois’ BIPA because it is a
comprehensive biometric law that could become a model for federal
legislation and a future standard to be used by the other states. Finally,
because individuals have a vested interest in protecting their biometric
data from misuse, the public could benefit from this analysis by
understanding what they can expect from their state and the federal
government to collect, store, use, and disseminate biometric data.
This essay’s questions are: (1) What are the biometric privacy
issues that States face regarding individual and corporate needs for
security and privacy?; (2) Why do several States continue to be
vulnerable to litigation regarding biometric privacy issues?; (3) How
does the State of Illinois address biometric privacy issues in its
statutory effort to protect the individuals against organizations that
employ biometric cybersecurity procedures?; and (4) How does the
State of Illinois Biometric Information Privacy Act benefit the federal
government and other states in their efforts to create and pass biometric
privacy laws that protect the privacy rights of their citizens?
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LITERATURE REVIEW
A.

A Brief History of Privacy Law

In the United States, privacy law began with the publication of
the 1890 Harvard Law Review article by Warren and Brandeis, where
the authors declared that privacy as a liberty right is “the right to be left
alone.”2 Warren and Brandeis asserted that the purpose of their article
was to “consider whether the existing law affords a principle which can
properly be invoked to protect the privacy of the individual; and, if it
does, what the nature and extent of such protection is.”3 Warren and
Brandeis suggested that the law of nuisance and defamation were
inadequate protections because these laws did not “protect the privacy
of the individual from invasion either by the too enterprising press, the
photographer, or the possessor of any other modern device for
recording or reproducing scenes or sounds.” 4 Essentially, Warren and
Brandeis argued that there was no law to prevent the publication of
information regarding individuals.5 The Boston Brahmins, the elite of
Boston high society in the 1890s, desired their data to remain private
and out of the public domain.6 The authors proposed that there should
be laws to prevent the publication of information individuals deem to
be confidential.7
In the first 50 years of the 20th Century, the law in the United
States did not recognize the right to privacy. In Olmstead, the Supreme
Court held that “obtaining of the evidence and its use at the trial did not
violate the Fourth Amendment.”8 According to the Fourth Amendment,
an individual is protected against unreasonable searches and seizures.9
The Fourth Amendment states that a search or seizure is reasonable
only when a warrant is issued by a neutral magistrate, where probable
cause exists, and where the warrant is “supported by [o]ath or
affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and
the persons or things to be seized”.10 In this case, the Court concluded

2

Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARVARD
L. REV. 193, 193 (1890).
3
Id. at 197.
4
Id. at 206.
5
See generally Warren & Brandeis, supra note 1.
6
Id.
7
Id.
8
Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 438 (1928).
9
U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
10
Id.
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that wiretapping a private telephone conversation without a warrant did
not violate Olmstead’s Fourth Amendment rights.11
The Supreme Court first expressly recognized the right to
privacy in Griswold.12 Here, three individuals were arrested and fined
for providing contraceptive advice: the executive director of the
Planned Parenthood League of Connecticut, a physician, and a Yale
University professor.13 In 1965, Connecticut law prohibited any
method of preventing conception.14 The issue was whether a married
couple possessed a right to privacy when given contraceptive advice.15
The Court held that the Connecticut law was unconstitutional and that
married couples enjoyed a right to privacy when being given
contraceptive advice.16
In Katz, the Supreme Court overruled Olmstead by
extending an individual’s Fourth Amendment protection to all areas or
places where that person demonstrates a reasonable expectation of
privacy.17 In his concurring opinion, Justice Harlan created the
reasonable expectation of privacy test for determining when a
government activity is a search.18 Justice Harlan formulated a twopronged test for determining whether the privacy interest is present.19
First, an individual must exhibit an actual or subjective expectation of
privacy.20 Second, the expectation of privacy must be an expectation
that society recognizes or is prepared to acknowledge as reasonable.21
After Griswold and Katz, the Court seemed to reverse itself
when it opined that the use and installation of a pen register, which is
an electronic machine that records the numbers that are dialed from a
telephone, by law enforcement is not a violation of an individual’s
reasonable expectation of privacy under the Fourth Amendment. 22 A
pen register is an archaic and pre-Internet device that only recorded
telephone numbers.23

11

See Olmstead, 277 U.S. at 438.
Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 484-85 (1965).
13
Id. at 480.
14
Id.
15
See generally Griswold, 381 U.S. 479.
16
Id.
17
See generally Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
18
See Katz 389 U.S. 347, 361 (Harlan, J., concurring).
19
Id.
20
Id.
21
Id.
22
Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735 (1979).
23
18 U.S.C. § 3127 (2018).
12
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In Kyllo, the Court opined that using a forward-looking infrared
(FLIR) device, which is also known as a thermal imaging device, to
monitor the amount of infrared radiation that emanates from an
individual’s home, was a search that required a warrant based on
probable cause.24 A FLIR is a thermographic camera, typically
employed on military and civilian aircraft, that senses infrared
radiation.25 Justice Scalia, who wrote the opinion, contended that the
device’s employment violated Kyllo’s reasonable expectation of
privacy.26 A decade later, Justice Scalia concluded that the Fourth
Amendment bars law enforcement from putting a global positioning
system on a vehicle to keep track of its location without a warrant.27
In Riley, the Supreme Court stated that the search and seizure
of a cell phone’s digital contents when a person is being arrested are
unconstitutional.28 In the Court’s opinion, a cell phone’s digital
contents are not a threat to officer safety.29 In this case, the issue was
that significant problems exist when searching the contents of a cell
phone.30 The Court concluded that searching the contents of a person’s
cell phone is equivalent to law enforcement searching through the
private papers located in an individual’s house.31
In Carpenter, Chief Justice Roberts wrote the majority
opinion.32 Here, the Court refused to give law enforcement access to
cell phone metadata without a warrant.33 The reasons dealt with the
breadth, depth, and comprehensive nature of the metadata collection
process.34 In other words, a person has a reasonable expectation of
privacy regarding the collection, use, and dissemination of cell phone
metadata.35
However, Carpenter’s four separate minority opinions are
particularly relevant regarding collecting, storing, using, and
disseminating biometric information about human beings’ innate
24

Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 31-41 (2001).
Anatholy Medvev, What is a “Forward Looking Infrared Imaging
System?”,
GUARDIAN.CO.UK,
(n.d.),
https://www.theguardian.com/notesandqueries/query/0,,-203857,00.html.
26
Kyllo, 533 U.S. 31, 33-35.
27
United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400 (2012).
28
Riley v. California, 573 U.S. 373 (2014).
29
Id. at 387.
30
Id. at 378.
31
Id. at 396-397.
32
Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206 (2018).
33
Id. at 2223.
34
Id.
35
Id. at 2219.
25
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characteristics.36 The views of Justices Alito, Kennedy, and Thomas
can be encapsulated into a simple phrase – no property rights, no
privacy.37 Justice Gorsuch’s opinion is of particular interest when
discussing whether biometric information should be protected.38
According to Justice Gorsuch, cell phone providers are bailees who
hold cell phone metadata to benefit the metadata or cell phone owners,
also known as bailors.39 A bailor is a person, natural or corporate, who
temporarily relinquishes possession of a good or other property under
a bailment agreement without surrendering ownership or property
rights.40 The bailor entrusts possession of a good or property to another
person known as the bailee.41 An example of a bailor/bailee
relationship occurs when an individual takes their watch to a jeweler to
be repaired. In this instance, the bailor is the watch owner who is taking
the watch to a jeweler to be repaired. The bailee is the jeweler whom
the bailor hires to repair the watch. The bailment is the agreement or
contract between the bailor and the bailee whereby the bailor entrusts
the bailee with the watch to be repaired.42
B.
Identifiers

Definition of Biometric Information and Biometric

The link between cell phone metadata and biometric data is that
biometric information can be considered metadata about an individual.
This is significant because, according to Pomerantz, the common-sense
definition of metadata is that it is data about data.43 This definition is
unsatisfactory because it is vague.44 However, Pomerantz pointed out
that the definition can be salvaged if data are thought of as a
“potentially informative object about another potentially informative
object”.45 In other words, metadata is a statement about a potentially
informative object.46 The conclusion is that human beings can be
36

Id. at 2223-61 (Kennedy, CJ, Alito & Thomas, JJ., dissenting).
Id.
38
Id. at 2268-69 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting).
39
Id.; see generally Donald L. Buresh, The Meaning of Justice Gorsuch’s
Dissent in Carpenter v. United States, 43 AMER. J. OF TRIAL ADV. 55 (2019),
https://heinonline.org/HOL/LandingPage?handle=hein.journals/amjtrad43&d
iv=7&id=&page=.
40
Bailor, BALLENTINE’S LAW DICTIONARY (3d ed. 1969).
41
Bailee, BALLENTINE’S LAW DICTIONARY (3d ed. 1969).
42
Regular deposit, BALLENTINE’S LAW DICTIONARY (3d ed. 1969).
37

43

JEFFREY C. POMERANTZ, METADATA 19 (2015).
Id.
45
Id. at 26.
46
Id.
44
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modeled as potentially informative objects, where biometric
information are implied statements about a person.
In consonance with these ideas, Illinois’ Biometric Information
Privacy Act defined biometric information to be “any information,
regardless of how it is captured, converted, stored, or shared, based on
an individual’s biometric identifier used to identify an individual.” 47
Biometric information does not include information derived from items
or procedures excluded under the definition of biometric identifiers. 48
Youmarin and Adler defined biometric information as the “decrease in
uncertainty about a person’s identity due to a set of biometric features
measurements.”49
Biometric features or identifiers are distinctive and measurable
characteristics used to label and describe individuals.50 Biometric
identifiers are typically categorized as physiological versus behavioral
characteristics.51 Physiological characteristics are related to the shape
of the body.52 For example, fingerprints, palm veins, face geometry,
deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA), palm prints, hand scans, iris
recognition, retina, and odor or scent are all physiological
characteristics.53 Behavioral factors are associated with behavior
patterns, including typing rhythm, gait, keystroke, signature,
behavioral profiling, and voice.54
It is also essential to understand what is not biometric
information. The Biometric Information Privacy Act states that
“writing samples, written signatures, photographs, human biological
samples used for valid scientific testing or screening, demographic
data, tattoo descriptions, or physical descriptions such as height,
47

Biometric Information Privacy Act, 740 ILCS 14/10 (2008),
https://www.ilga.gov/legislation/ilcs/ilcs3.asp?ActID=3004&ChapterID=57.
48
Id.
49
Richard Youmarin, & Andy Adler, Measuring Information Content in
Biometric Features, In NIKOLAOS V. BOULGOURIS, KONSTANTINOS N.
PLATANIOTIS, & EVANGELIA MICHELI-TZANAKOU (EDS.). BIOMETRICS:
THEORY, METHODS, AND APPLICATIONS 579, 579-580 (John Wiley & Sons,
Inc., 2010).
50
Abdulaziz Alzubaidi & Jugal Kalita,, Authentication of Smartphone Users
Using Behavioral Biometrics, 18 IEEE COMMUNICATIONS SURVEYS &
TUTORIALS, 1998, 2001 (2016).
51
Id.
52
Id.
53
Natalie Prescott, The Anatomy of Biometric Laws: What U.S. Companies
Need To Know in 2020, THE NATIONAL LAW REVIEW (2020), available at
https://www.natlawreview.com/article/anatomy-biometric-laws-what-uscompanies-need-to-know-2020.
54
Alzubaidi & Kalita, supra note 49, at 2001.
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weight, hair color, or eye color are not biometric information.” 55
Biometric information also does not include “donated organs, tissues,
or parts … or blood or serum stored on behalf of recipients or potential
recipients of living or cadaveric transplants and obtained or stored by
a federally designated organ procurement agency.” 56 The term
biometric identifiers does not cover regulated biological materials
(specifically, in Illinois, the Genetic Information Privacy Act of 2020),
information captured from a patient in a health care setting, or
information collected, used, or stored for health care treatment,
payment, or operations under the federal Health Insurance Portability
and Accountability Act.57 Finally, biometric identifiers do not involve
“an X-ray, roentgen process, computed tomography, M.R.I., P.E.T.
scan, mammography, or other image or film of the human anatomy
used to diagnose, prognose, or treat an illness or other medical
condition or to further validate scientific testing or screening.”58
C.

Reasonable Expectation of Privacy

The reasonable expectation of privacy test may be inapplicable
when analyzing the implications of collecting, using, storing, and
disseminating biometric information because it may be readily
discernable by third parties. When information is released voluntarily
by an individual to a third party, that individual has no reasonable
expectation of privacy.59 Conversely, it can be inferred that when
information is revealed involuntarily, a person may have a reasonable
expectation of privacy.60 Even so, the scope of this study is limited to
when biometric information is voluntarily divulged. This study also
discusses the legal consequences to third parties that involuntarily
collect, use, store, and disseminate biometric data about individuals, as
set forth in more detail below.
D.

Biometric Information and Property Rights

Property rights give individuals privacy rights regarding their
biometric information. In Carpenter, Justices Alito, Kennedy, and
Thomas proclaimed in their minority opinions that property rights
bestow an individual’s privacy rights.61 Justice Gorsuch also
55

Biometric Information Privacy Act § 10.
Id.
57
Id.
58
Id.
59
United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 409 (2012).
60
See Id.
61
Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2223-61 (2018) (Kennedy, CJ,
Alito & Thomas, JJ., dissenting).
56
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acknowledged that privacy rights are intimately related to property
rights when he stated that cell phone providers are bailees when
entrusted with the metadata generated by a cell phone by cell phone
owners or bailors.62 In his seminal work on privacy, Lessig argued that
property is privacy.63 Humbach effectively argued that property rights
had protected privacy in privately-owned spaces that store personal
information such as papers and digital equipment for hundreds of
years.64 Kerrane observed that when an individual possesses a
legitimate property interest in a location or an item, third parties that
gain unauthorized access to that property violate an individual’s
reasonable expectation of privacy.65
Because places and objects are external to a human being and
thus not necessarily “private,” the question is whether individuals
possess property rights to their biometric information. According to the
Biometric Information Privacy Act, “[n]o private entity in possession
of a biometric identifier or biometric information may sell, lease, trade,
or otherwise profit from a person’s or a customer’s biometric identifier
or biometric information.”66 This statement sounds all too familiar to
the right of publicity which protects a person’s intangible proprietary
interest in the commercial value in their identity.67 The right to privacy
to information regarding one’s person was clarified by Prosser when
he organized the right to privacy doctrine into the following four
distinct torts: (1) unreasonable intrusion upon another’s seclusion, (2)
public disclosure of private facts, (3) false light invasion of privacy,
and (4) appropriation of another’s name or likeness.68
From the four torts listed above, the public disclosure of private
facts is the most relevant to disclosing biometric information. Although
most state laws specify that the right of publicity protects a person’s
62

Id. at 2268-69 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting).
See generally Lawrence Lessig, Privacy as Property, 69 SOC’Y. RSCH. 247
(2002),
https://www.jstor.org/stable/40971547?seq=1#page_scan_tab_contents.
64
John A. Humbach, Privacy and the Right of Free Expression, 11 FIRST
AMEND.
L.
REV.
16,
17
(2012),
https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/lawfaculty/863/.
65
Kaitlyn A. Kerrane, Keeping up with Officer Jones: A Comprehensive Look
at the Fourth Amendment and GPS Surveillance. 79 FORDHAM L. REV. 1695,
1709 (2011), https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/flr/vol79/iss4/8.
66
Biometric Information Privacy Act, 740 ILCS 14/15(c) (2008),
https://www.ilga.gov/legislation/ilcs/ilcs3.asp?ActID=3004&ChapterID=57.
67
Lugosi v. Universal Pictures, 603 P.2d 425, 445 (1979).
68
William L. Prosser, Privacy, 48 CALIF. L. REV. 383, 389 (1960),
https://www.jstor.org/stable/3478805?refreqid=excelsior%3Ab690af40da42
182b188450a5d603a842&seq=1.
63
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identity when such information is used for commercial purposes,
private individuals, not just celebrities, can also sue for instances of
public disclosure of private facts.69 In other words, the unauthorized
use of biometric information about a person, much like the
infringement of a person’s right of publicity, is an encroachment on an
individual’s property rights.70 The implication is that individuals
possess property rights to their biometric information, and those rights
are deserving of legal protection. One function of a sovereign state
should be to protect individual property rights.71
E.

The Importance of Biometric Privacy

At both the federal and state levels, private organizations and
governments readily acquire vast amounts of data on individuals as
they go about their daily business.72 Almost everything people use
these days demands that they log into their email address, Facebook
profile, and even cell phones.73 These software applications collect and
store metadata regarding what websites are visited, how long one is on
a website, what a person buys on a website, etc.74 These organizations,
such as Facebook and Google, make money by collecting personal
information and then selling it to third parties.75 What is immediately
apparent from the picture just painted is that privacy is on the decline.
F.

Reasons for Why Biometric Privacy Is Important

According to Reetz and his colleagues, the technologies
associated with social media, electronic communication, mobile
devices, intelligent home assistants, biometric authentication,
autonomous vehicles, digital health monitors, and the emerging
dominance of artificial intelligence are some of the forces transforming

69

JONATHAN S. JENNINGS, & J. MICHAEL MONAHAN, TRADEMARKS AND
UNFAIR COMPETITION: CRITICAL ISSUES IN THE LAW 5-13 (2014).
70
Id. at 174-175.
71
ROGER PILON, Property Rights and the Constitution, in CATO INSTITUTE,
CATO HANDBOOK FOR POLICYMAKERS 173-91 (8th ed. 2017),
https://www.cato.org/cato-handbook-policymakers/cato-handbook-policymakers-8th-edition-2017/property-rights-constitution.
72
Michael Monajemi, Privacy Regulation in the Age of Biometrics that Deal
with a New World Order of Information, 25 UNIV. OF MIAMI INT’L. & COMP.
L.
REV.
371,
373
(2018),
https://repository.law.miami.edu/umiclr/vol25/iss2/7.
73
Id.
74
Id.
75
Id.
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human activities, both in the public and private arenas.76 Central to
understanding privacy in general, and biometric privacy in particular,
is the question of how much people value their privacy and what evils
should privacy and biometric privacy attempt to deter.77 The public’s
comfort level regarding collecting personal information depends on the
type of data being collected and how such data is used by organizations
collecting, storing, using, and disseminating that data.78
On its face, the future of privacy is uncertain. According to
Kleven, privacy cases’ critical procedural issue is “minimum virtual
contacts” to establish personal jurisdiction.79 According to the Legal
Information Institute, minimum contacts for a non-resident defendant
with a forum state (i.e., the state where a plaintiff brings a suit) are the
connections that a defendant has with the forum state.80 The
maintenance of a lawsuit without minimum contacts in the state offends
the “traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice” and, in turn,
violates the Due Process Clause.81 Kleven proposed that minimum
virtual contacts are similar to, if not the same as, the traditional
minimum contacts legal principle.82
Hu observed that governments’ evolution into cybersurveillance states is occurring because governments are employing
technologies that combine biometric and biographic data to target
digital data associated with suspicious individuals.83 Hu opined that the
progression to becoming a cyber-surveillance state is making it
increasingly difficult to identify and challenge an individual’s

76

Margaret A. Reetz, Lauren B. Prunty, Gregory S. Mantych, & David J.
Hommel, Cyber Risks: Evolving Threats, Emerging Coverages, and Ensuing
Case Law, 122 PENN STATE L. REV. 727, 727 (2018),
https://www.pennstatelawreview.org/print-issues/cyber-risks-evolvingthreats-emerging-coverages-and-ensuing-case-law/.
77
Matthew B. Kugler, From Identification to Identity Theft: Public
Perceptions of Biometric Privacy Harms, 10 U.C. IRVINE L. REV. 107, 107
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constitutional right to a reasonable expectation of privacy.84 Jones
observed that biometric identification systems had transformed
government, military, and private-industry identification and
verification procedures.85
G.

Examples of Why Biometric Privacy Is Important

But there is more. According to Metzger, businesses
increasingly require their employees to permit biometric data collection
technologies to clock their hours, probably to verify or increase
productivity.86 The issue is that with this embracing of biometric
technology comes privacy and security concerns.87 For example, the
front office of a Major League Baseball (MLB) team is charged with
creating a solid team, which usually results in winning more games,
attracting more fans, and increasing profits.88 In many cases, players
need coaching to hone their baseball skills, and clubs need to separate
major league-caliber players from the plethora of minor league players
whose abilities do not meet MLB performance standards.89 Zych aptly
observed that the question of property rights to biometric data is
temporarily set aside in favor of exploiting the data to win baseball
games.90 Justice Gorsuch precisely attempted to resolve this issue in his
dissent in Carpenter when he opined that cell phone providers are
bailees entrusted with cell phone metadata by bailors or cell phone
owners.91 Furthermore, Garlewicz described how soccer teams are
collecting biometric data about their players to determine which
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players will be successful in the major leagues.92 Gale analyzed the
legal implications in collecting athlete biometric data (ABD), pointing
out that a precise ABD definition is difficult to achieve due to the
myriad of ways ABD interacts with the sports industry.93
Logan stated that eye-tracking technology has existed since the
1950s.94 As eye-tracking hardware and software have become
ubiquitous,95 Logan argued that if privacy rights are established for
biometric identifiers, there will be less friction in creating new
technologies.96 According to Logan, this situation will permit rapid
growth for eager and informed consumers.97 In particular, Norris
pointed out that casinos have been tracking people’s activities inside
their establishments for years.98 Casinos possess an abundance of
private data that demonstrates how people behave when they are under
surveillance.99
Still another example is that immigration officials and other
bureaucrats collect biometric data to ensure that immigrants’ identities
can be unambiguously determined.100 Classification systems were
generated to ensure that a person’s identity was unambiguously
verified by employing official documents over time and across
countries.101 According to Kim, the use of biometric data in the
immigration process is beneficial not only to the government but also
92
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to the individual because it can speed up an inherently tedious
process.102
There are definite and well-defined benefits of collecting,
storing, using, and disseminating biometric information by
organizations.103 However, in all fairness, the harms should also be
discussed. Reetz and his colleagues observed that significant risks and
exposures have evolved from concerns regarding personal privacy and
the confidentiality of corporate assets to threats of organizational
interference and operational disruptions, such as cybersecurity
attacks.104 They also observed that with the emergence of biometric
data collection, storage, use, and dissemination, there are direct threats
of illegal transfers of funds and actual physical harm, injury, and
loss.105 The question that Reetz and his colleagues asked was whether
the privacy “landscape [has] changed so profoundly that entirely new
approaches are required.”106
H.

Harms Due to Violations of Biometric Privacy

According to Wright, there are broad implications of biometric
privacy harms that justify far-reaching privacy regulations rather than
a narrow concentration on data security and self-regulation.107 Wright
argued that in regulating the collection, storage, use, and dissemination
of biometric data, a collaborative approach with private organizations
might significantly benefit society because of the lack of technical
expertise among legislators.108 An example of harm is privacy leakage,
where privacy leakage is the amount of information that a public

102

Id. at 774.
Hu, supra note 82, at 163 (“Biometric identification and identity
assessments are becoming essential tools for multiple preventive purposes in
criminal, military, and intelligence contexts.”); Zych, supra note 87, at 130131 (discussing the relationship between athlete biometric data and team
success); Norris, supra note 97, at 286-287 (explaining how biometric data
can benefit casinos and their players); Kim, supra note 99, at 760 (explaining
how migrants use biometric information as “identity tags” to establish the
authenticity of family relations).
104
Reetz et al., supra note 75, at 727.
105
Id. at 727, 751 n. 143.
106
Id at 727.
107
Elias Wright, The Future of Facial Recognition Is Not Fully Known:
Developing Privacy and Security Regulatory Mechanisms for Facial
Recognition in the Retail Sector, 29 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP., MEDIA, AND
ENT. L. J. 611, 611 (2019), https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/iplj/vol29/iss2/6.
108
Id. at 677.
103

56

SANTA CLARA HIGH TECH. L. J.

[Vol. 38

message contains about biometric enrollments.109 According to
Gomez-Barrero and his colleagues, when morphed biometric samples
or templates are introduced into a biometric recognition system, the
subjects that contribute to the morphed sample can be successfully
verified against an enrolled template.110 This unique link precipitates
serious security gaps when verifying electronic travel documents.111
Gomez-Barrero and his colleagues observed that a systematic approach
to predicting biometric vulnerabilities has not yet been established.112
They then proposed a framework for evaluating the exposure to
security gaps of biometric systems.113
Thus, it is evident that biometric privacy is of paramount
importance. However, to appreciate the importance of biometric
privacy, a melodic interlude into the realm of privacy law, in general,
is needed. The succeeding subsections of this literature will discuss the
European Union’s (EU) General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR),
followed by a brief discussion of the privacy laws of the several states,
including the California Consumer Privacy Act and its amendment, the
California Privacy Rights Act, the Nevada Revised Statutes Chapter
603A, the Virginia Consumer Data Protection Act, along with a
discussion of the status of various privacy bills in the several states.
Next, the essay will talk about the biometric privacy laws in Illinois,
Texas, and Washington, where the emphasis is given to the Illinois
Biometric Privacy Act (BIPA) because it is the most detailed of the
various biometric privacy laws currently in force. Finally, the study
will summarize the literature review contained herein.
II.

GENERAL DATA PROTECTION REGULATION

The General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) is a set of
legal guidelines that deal with collecting and processing personal
information about people who live and reside in the European Union.114
109
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The GDPR applies independently from where a website is based. 115
Any site accessed by a European visitor, regardless of whether an
organization markets goods or services to EU residents, must comply
with the regulation.116
A. A Brief History of the General Data Protection
Regulation
On September 23, 1980, the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), a European international
organization, approved the Guidelines on the Protection of Privacy and
Transborder Flows of Personal Data.117 Although the OECD guidelines
were not obligatory, the document specified a framework for future
privacy legislation and court opinions.118 The principles listed in the
guidelines (1) ensured that the collection of personal information was
lawful, (2) specified that the use of personal information should be
accurate, complete, and current, (3) stated that the purpose of collecting
information should be explicit before any data is collected, (4) required
that personal information should be reasonably protected against the
risks of destruction, disclosure, loss, modification, unauthorized
access, and use, (5) demanded that practices and procedures be readily
available, (6) acknowledged that individuals have the right to acquire
their personal information that was collected or verify that the data
exists, and (7) warranted that data control organizations were
accountable for complying with these principles.119
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In 1990, the European Commission (EC) published a Data
Protection Directive (DPD) proposal.120 In 1995, after five years of
negotiations, the final DPD, also known as Directive 95/46/EC, was
adopted by the EU.121 There were immediate problems with the
directive because it did not harmonize with the privacy laws of EU
member nations, and thus, the enforcement of the directive was
haphazard.122 In 2009, the EC began consulting with the EU member
nations, and in 2012, the EC published the first proposed text of the
GDPR.123 In 2015, and after nearly 4,000 amendments, the Council of
the European Union (CEU) published its proposal for the GDPR and
started its negotiations with the European Parliament (EP).124 In
December 2015, the EP and the CEU agreed on the final text of the
GDPR, which was adopted in May 2016, and went in force on May 25,
2018, replacing the DPD.125
B.

Content of the General Data Protection Regulation

The GDPR consists of 11 chapters, 99 articles, and 173
recitals.126 The general obligations that an organization must follow are
contained in Article 24, whereas Article 28 categorizes the technical
and organizational measures for data processors.127 According to
Article 6, the processing of personal information should be predicated
on at least one lawful basis, such as “consent, compliance with a legal
duty, contract, performance, protection of the vital interests of the data
subject, and the legitimate interest of the data controller.” 128 Article
9(1) prevents entities from the processing of personal information that
reveals “racial or ethnic origin, sexual orientation, political sentiments,
religious beliefs, union membership, or genetic or biometric data that
can be employed in identifying an individual.”129 Article 9(2) lists the
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exclusions to Article 9(1), including when a data subject agrees to
publicize personal information.130
Article 30 requires that personal information controllers and
processors maintain a record of their processing activities.131 Article
4(11) posits that consent must be explicit, while opt-out consent is
forbidden.132 A data subject can withdraw consent at any time.133 Under
Article 33, data protection authorities must be informed within 72
hours after a breach becomes known.134 Article 34 demands that if there
is a high risk that individual rights and freedoms will be violated due
to a breach, data subjects must be informed, subject to the exceptions
in Article 34(3).135 Article 37 specifies that organizations have a data
protection officer charged with protecting the personal information of
data subjects and is responsible for informing data controllers,
processors, and employees that they are accountable under the
GDPR.136
According to Article 3(2), the GDPR applies to any company
that falls within its territorial and material scope, including firms
located in the United States.137 First, Article 3(2) applies to the
processing of personal information of an establishment or
organization.138 Second, the GDPR pertains to the processing of
personal information of data subjects regarding the offering of goods
or services to EU data subjects.139 Finally, the GDPR concerns the data
processing activities that deal with monitoring the activities of EU data
subjects.140 What Article 3(2) means is that if an American firm does
business with individuals or organizations in the EU, it must comply
with the GDPR. Regarding biometric privacy, Article 14(4) is
particularly relevant because when a data controller intends to process
data for which the relevant consents are not obtained, the GDPR
130
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requires that the data controller provide the data subject with the new
reason for collecting the data.141 When considering Articles 9(1) and
14(4) together, they explicitly address how biometric information
should be handled by organizations that do business with EU data
subjects or EU establishments.
C.
Forgotten

Google v. Costeja González and The Right to Be

The case Google Spain SL, Google Inc. v. Agencia Española
de Protección de Datos, Mario Costeja González is particularly
significant when discussing privacy and biometric privacy within the
European Union.142 Costeja González is significant because it
demonstrates the European belief that the right to privacy, and
biometric privacy, can be construed to be the right to be forgotten. 143
The case balances an individual’s right to privacy and the EU’s data
protection regulations versus an organization’s and the public’s right to
know.144
In the case, the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU)
held that Google Spain SL and Google, Inc. must eradicate links to web
pages that are freely accessible worldwide when individuals whose
personal information is contained therein demand that the links be
removed.145 The result of the CJEU ruling was that an internet search
engine must address the requests of individuals who ask that links be
eliminated to freely accessible web pages when a third party conducts
a search based on the individual’s name.146 The eradication reasons
include situations where the search results are facially inadequate, no
longer relevant, or an excessive amount of time has elapsed. 147 If the
search engine refuses to honor the plea, an individual can petition the
EU courts to redress grievances.148 The European courts reserve the
141
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right to overrule the search engine’s decision and order the controller
to take specific measures accordingly.149
In 1998, La Vanguardia, a Spanish newspaper, published two
announcements regarding a forced sale of properties from social
security debts.150 The statements were published by the Spanish
Ministry of Labor and Social Affairs to entice people to bid on an
auction’s properties.151 The announcements were also published on the
newspaper’s website.152 One of the properties belonged to Mario
Costeja González, and he was specifically named in one of the
announcements.153 In 2010, Costeja González requested that his name
no longer be part of the Google database.154 Costeja González wanted
his name removed because the forced sale occurred nearly ten years
earlier and was no longer relevant.155 La Vanguardia denied the request
under the belief that erasing Costeja González’s data was improper
because the Spanish Ministry of Labor and Social Affairs had ordered
that his name be published.156
In his complaint, Costeja González asked Google Spain SL to
remove the links.157 Google Spain SL alerted Google, Inc., regarding
the suit.158 Costeja González then filed a complaint with the Spanish
Data Protection Agency, or the Agencia Española de Protección de
Datos (AEPD), requesting that La Vanguardia, and Google Spain SL
or Google, Inc. delete the links.159 On July 30, 2010, the AEPD rejected
the complaint against La Vanguardia but endorsed the complaint
against Google Spain SL and Google, Inc.160 Google Spain SL and
Google, Inc. appealed Spain’s National High Court decision, or the
Audiencia Nacional (AN).161 Google Spain SL and Google, Inc. argued
that (1) EU Directive 95/46/EC did not have jurisdiction over Google,
149
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Inc., (2) no data processing occurred, (3) if data processing did occur,
neither Google, Inc. nor Google Spain SL were data controllers, and
Costeja González had no right to ask the search engine to remove the
offending links.162 The AN issued a stay pending a preliminary decision
from the CJEU based on EU Directive 95/46/EC.163 The case was heard
by the CJEU, and on May 13, 2014, the CJEU published its
judgment.164
The CJEU concluded that Google Spain SL’s and Google,
Inc.’s reasons were not compelling.165 The court opined that Google,
Inc. was responsible for removing Costeja González’s data.166 The
forced sale of Costeja González’s property should be electronically
forgotten because the information was no longer relevant.167 The CJEU
also held that Article 14(a) of EU Directive 95/46/EC as related to
Articles 7(e) and 7(f) permitted Costeja González to object to the
search engine keeping his data online.168 Finally, Article 12(b) allowed
Costeja González to ask the search engine to remove his data. 169 In
terms of biometric information, Costeja González implies that EU data
subjects have the right to request that organizations subject to the
GDPR remove their data without limitation, subject to the exceptions
contained in the regulation.170
III.

PRIVACY LAWS IN THE SEVERAL STATES

In this section of this essay, the California Consumer Privacy
Act and its amendment, the California Privacy Rights Act, the Nevada
privacy law, the Maine privacy law, the Virginia Consumer Data
Protection Act, and the Colorado Privacy Act will be discussed in turn.
The states where privacy bills are under legislative review will also be
examined because it is crucial to understand where privacy law is
headed.
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California Consumer Privacy Act

On June 28, 2018, then California Governor Jerry Brown
signed SB-375, also known as the California Consumer Privacy Act
(CCPA).171 The California legislature passed the first amendments to
the CCPA on August 31, 2018, and the CCPA became effective on
January 1, 2020.172 The purpose of the law was to protect the personal
information of California consumers regardless of what sector of the
economy the data originated.173 In the United States, there is no
comprehensive privacy law that defends consumers from the
collection, storage, use, and dissemination of personal information by
private entities such as the GDPR.174 Congress has passed privacy laws
on a topic-by-topic basis predicated on practical political needs, such
as adopting the Fair Credit Reporting Act, the Health Insurance
Portability and Accountability Act, and the Gramm-Leach-Bliley
Act.175
The CCPA considers a California resident domiciled to be a
California consumer under the CCPA.176 The statute does not protect
the personal information of individuals temporarily located within
California.177 The CCPA applies to for-profit businesses and
partnerships that collect and process personal information of California
consumers, where (1) the annual revenue of the company is greater than
$25 million, (2) the firm receives or discloses the personal information
of at least 50,000 California residents, and (3) fifty percent or more of
an entity’s annual revenue is derived from selling personal
information.178
According to the CCPA, a California resident possesses the
right to know the classes of personal information collected, the source
of the personal information, and what entities are purchasing that
information.179 California residents also have the right to review the
personal information being amassed to ensure that only correct
171
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information is being marshaled.180 Finally, California residents enjoy
the right to request that their personal information be deleted, or in
other words, California residents possess the right to be forgotten.181
There are seven critical provisions in the CCPA. First,
California consumers have the right to opt out of the sale of their
personal information.182 Second, businesses that the CCPA cover
cannot charge California residents a higher price when they exercise
their rights under the Act.183 Third, a data collection firm is required to
give California consumers a copy of their data in an electronic format
that is easily transferable.184 Fourth, for individuals that are under 16
years of age, a data collection company must be given permission by
the parents or guardians of that individual before the entity can sell the
person’s personal information.185 Fifth, any company doing business in
California must disclose to the public on an annual basis the categories,
recipients, and sources of all of the data that the firm collects, stores,
discloses, or sells.186 Sixth, a link must exist on a corporation’s website
entitled “Do Not Sell My Personal Information” that allows California
residents to exercise their right not to sell their personal information.187
Finally, an organization doing business in California is required to
stipulate two methods where a consumer can request their personal
information from a company.188
The CCPA specifies two types of non-compliance penalties.
First, there are penalties due to security breaches. According to the
CCPA, the damages are at most $750 per violation or the actual
damages, whatever is the greater amount.189 The Attorney General of
California may enforce the privacy provision of the CCPA via civil
penalties with a maximum of $7,500 per violation.190 For example, it is
not uncommon for a data breach to involve one million individuals. At
180
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$750 per violation, the maximum penalty would be $750 million,
whereas if the Attorney General of California decides to sue the entity,
the maximum penalty would be $7.5 billion.191 Thus, it is readily
apparent that the maximum penalties under the CCPA could be beyond
the financial reach of many organizations.192
Palmieri employed a three-prong analysis framework when
analyzing the effectiveness of the CCPA.193 First, the data stewardship
prong examines a company’s personal information collection
process.194 In this first element, Palmieri opined that although an
individual is at the center of the decision-making process regarding
collecting, storing, using, and disseminating their personal information,
consumers are rarely aware of the nature of the data being collected or
how that data will be used.195 Another issue with this first prong is that
many websites use a take-it-or-leave-it approach when an individual is
given a choice whether to accept or reject a firm’s collection of their
personal information.196 In the initial version of the CCPA, the consent
mechanism was not nuanced, reflecting the consent process’ myriad
variations.197
The second prong of Palmieri’s analysis dealt with a
government’s balancing of the harms between alienating an individual
versus a business when an entity collects personal information on the
person.198 The issue is what weight the State of California should be
given to each possible harm.199 One factor to consider is the industry
being examined when safeguards are present to prevent or regulate
cross-industry sharing of data.200 According to Palmieri, the CCPA
volunteers no guidance to entities contemplating whether a specific
processing activity is worth the risk.201 The third and final prong of
Palmieri’s analysis is the element of redressability, meaning that there
are sufficient procedures and precautions to ensure that California
consumers have access to their personal information and can respond
191
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to improper uses of that data.202 According to Palmieri, the CCPA
excels at providing transparency to consumers.203 Palmieri aptly
pointed out that the deletion of personal information is not the only
mechanism available.204 Still, the opt-out choice also ensures that an
individual’s personal information is not collected.205 In other words,
data that are never collected in the first place can never be wrong.
For these and other limitations of the CCPA, in the November
2020 election, California residents amended the California Consumer
Privacy Act in passing the California Privacy Rights Act.
B.

California Privacy Rights Act

In the November 2020 election, the citizens of California
passed Proposition 24, also known as the California Privacy Rights Act
(CPRA), by 56 percent.206 With the passage of the CPRA, California
citizens now have the right to correct inaccurate information, the right
to have their personal information that is collected be subordinate to
data minimization and purpose limitations, and the right to receive a
notice from businesses planning on employing sensitive personal
information, along with the right to request that such an organization
stop using that information.207 The CPRA expanded the right to access
information regardless of when it was collected unless it is impossible
or impracticable, the right to opt-out of sharing information with third
parties regardless of whether an individual is a buyer or a seller, and
the right to sue a business when the entity exposes user names and
passwords.208 The CPRA is scheduled to take effect on January 1,
2023.209
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The CPRA consists of a fair number of enhancements to the
CCPA.210 The CPRA changed the threshold for the number of
consumers or households to 100,000 and now applies to businesses that
receive 50 percent or more of their annual revenue from selling or
sharing consumer personal information.211 The CPRA gives California
consumers the right to opt-out of automated decision-making
technology associated with a consumer’s economic situation, health
and personal preferences, location or movements, and work
performance while strengthening the opt-out rights for minors.212 The
CPRA introduced the notion of sensitive personal information, such as
biometric or health information, the content of non-public information
(i.e., email and text messages), ethnicity, genetic data, race, religious
or philosophical beliefs, sex life or sexual orientation information, and
union membership, where sensitive personal information now
possesses stringent consent, disclosure, opt-out requirements, and
purpose limitation requirements.213
Under the CPRA, consumers have the right, subject to some
exceptions, to demand the deletion of any consumer personal
information purchase or sold.214 Suppose consumer personal
information is inaccurate. With the passage of the CPRA, California
consumers now have the right to correct erroneous information along
with the right to restrict the use and disclosure of sensitive personal
information.215 The CPRA distinguishes between requests for specific
information from requests for general personal information. Under the
CPRA, consumers have the right to access meaningful information
regarding the decision-making logic used in collecting, using, storing,
disseminating information, and describing the likely outcomes of the
process.216 Under the CPRA, consumers may request the business
transmit specific personal information, when technically feasible, to
third parties.217 The CPRA requires a company to perform an annual
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cybersecurity audit and submit a personal information processing risk
assessment to the California Privacy Protection Agency.218
The CPRA places limits on the collection, storage, use,
and retention of personal information that is reasonably necessary and
proportionate to achieve the desired end of collecting the personal
information in the first place.219 The CPRA increased the fine to $7,500
per violation involving individuals under 16 years of age.220 There is
no longer a 30-day cure period following notice of a breach.221 Finally,
the CPRA expanded the scope of a consumer privacy right of action so
that violations of email accounts are now covered.222 Thus, the CCPA,
together with the CPRA, is currently looking a lot like the GDPR in
terms of enforcement, opt-in and opt-out restrictions, scope, the
meaning of personal information, and the rights of access, correction,
deletion, disclosure, erasure, as well as portability, penalties, and
verification.223
C.

Nevada’s Privacy Law

On May 29, 2019, the Nevada Senate approved Senate Bill
(SB-220), which amended Nevada’s existing privacy law from 2017 or
NRS 603A.300 – 603A.360 and became effective on October 1,
2019.224 SB-220 gave consumers the right to opt out to sell their
personal information.225
The Nevada privacy law concerns “operators” who are defined
as any person that meets the following criteria: (1) owns and operates
a website or online service as a business, (2) collects and maintains
personal information from consumers who reside in Nevada and who
access the website or online service, and (3) focuses its activities on
Nevada, conducts a transaction in Nevada, or purposefully avails itself
of performing its activities in Nevada.226 In terms of the Nevada privacy
218
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law, personal information consists of a person’s first and last name,
social security number, driver’s license number or identification card
number, account number, credit card number, debit card number, or
any other identifier that permits an individual to be contacted either
physically or online.227
The Nevada privacy law applies to persons that (1) advertise
their products or services in Nevada, (2) ship their products or services
to Nevada, or (3) sell their products or services to Nevada citizens. 228
The Nevada privacy law does not apply if (1) a person or entity is
located in Nevada, (2) the revenue of the person or entity primarily
comes from a source other than selling goods or services on its website
or online service, and (3) the website or online service has less than
20,000 unique visitors per year.229
Companies that satisfy the Nevada privacy law must create and
maintain an expressed privacy policy document that (1) categorizes the
personal information that is collected and the third parties to whom
such information is shared, (2) describes the process, if it exists, for a
user to be notified and to review and request changes to the collected
personal information, (3) informs a user whether a third party is
collecting personal information through different websites, (4) lists the
effective date of the privacy policy.230 SB-220 requires a person or an
entity to create a designated request address, either a physical address,
email address, toll-free telephone number, or website where an
individual can submit a request.231 This information must be published
on the website’s privacy policy statement, and a person or entity must
respond to the request within 60 days of receiving the request. 232 The
penalty for non-compliance is at most $5,000 per violation.233
According to Jordan, although SB-220 covers a wide range of
information, the scope of Nevada’s privacy law is much narrower than
the GDPR and the CCPA.234 SB-220 does provide consumers with the
right to request that their personal information not be sold to third
parties.235
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D. Maine’s Act to Protect the Privacy of Online Customer
Information
On July 1, 2020, Maine became the next state to regulate online
data.236 Like the Nevada privacy law, the Maine privacy law is not a
comprehensive privacy law like the CCPA.237 However, in contrast to
the California and Nevada privacy laws, the Maine law focuses
exclusively on data collected by Internet Service Providers (ISPs).238
The Maine law prevents ISPs from disclosing, selling, or permitting
access to customer personal information.239 According to the Maine
privacy law, customers include applicants for service, current
subscribers, and former subscribers of ISPs.240 The law protects a
customer’s name, address, social security number, billing address, and
demographic data.241 It also safeguards web browsing history,
application use history, precise geolocation data, financial data, health
data, information on the customer’s children, the customer’s device
identifiers, the content of customer communications, and origin and
destination IP addresses.242 An ISP may use, disclose, sell, or allow
access to personal information only if a customer consents.243 A
consumer may withdraw their consent at any time.244
An ISP is not permitted to refuse service to a customer when
the customer does not consent, charge a customer for not providing
consent, or give a customer a discount for consenting.245 As for
information that is not personal information, an ISP may use, disclose,
sell, or allow access, provided that a customer does not give written
notice to the ISP that they do not agree to such actions.246 Even so, an
ISP may collect, retain, use, disclose, sell, or allow access to customer
information to provide Internet service, to advertise or market services,
to comply with a legal court order, to bill and collect payment, to
protect customers from fraud and other abuses, and to provide
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geolocation data in an emergency to law enforcement, a customer’s
legal guardian or family member, or for assisting in an emergency
response.247
E.

Virginia’s Consumer Data Protection Act

On March 2, 2021, Governor Ralph Northam signed the
Virginia Consumer Data Protection Act (CDPA) into law.248 According
to Horner, the CDPA establishes a framework for controlling and
processing personal data in Virginia.249 The law applies to all persons
that conduct business in the state, and either (1) control or process
personal data of at least 100,000 consumers or (2) obtain over 50
percent of gross revenue from the sale of personal data and control or
process personal data of more than 25,000 consumers.250 The law does
not apply to state or local government entities and possesses exceptions
for specific types of data or information that are governed by federal
law.251 The law gives consumers the rights to access, correct, delete,
and copy personal data.252 Under Virginia law, a consumer has the right
to opt-out of the processing of personal data for targeted advertising,
the sale of personal data, or the profiling of the consumer and the right
to appeal the decision of an entity’s data controller.253 The CDPA states
that the Virginia Attorney General possesses the exclusive authority to
enforce any violations of the law.254 The CDPA established the
Virginia Joint Commission on Technology and Science (VJCTS) to
support the Virginia Attorney General’s efforts.255 The Virginia
legislature charged the VJCTS with reviewing the act’s provisions,.256
The effective date of the CDPA is January 1, 2023.257
According to Rippy, the scope of the CDPA is controlled by
the definitions of the terms “consumer,” “sale of personal information,”
247
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and “monetary and other valuable consideration.” 258 According to the
CDPA, a consumer is a natural person that resides in Virginia that acts
as an individual or in the context of a household.259 In contrast to the
CCPA, the CDPA does not include employee data that may be
collected by businesses.260 The CDPA defines valuable consideration
strictly as money exchanged when data is sold with the following
exceptions: (1) disclosures to processors, (2) disclosures to third parties
where a consumer requested a product or service, (3) disclosures to an
affiliate of a controller, (4) unrestricted disclosures by consumers to the
public via mass media, and (5) disclosures due to mergers, acquisitions,
etc.261 The entity exemptions include (1) a Virginia agency, board,
bureau, commission, district, or political subdivision, (2) a financial
institution that is subject to the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, (3) an entity
subject to the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act and
the Health Information Technology for Economic and Clinical Health
Act, (4) a nonprofit organization, and (5) an institution of higher
learning such as a college or university.262 Much like the GDPR and
the CCPA, the CDPA has provisions that limit the collection and use
of data, mandates technical safeguards, and require data protection
assessments, data processing agreements, and a privacy policy.263
Unfortunately, the CDPA has specified neither a time
requirement regarding disclosures of personal information to a
consumer nor the format used in disclosing personal information to a
consumer.264 The CDPA does not provide for a private right of
action.265 Even so, when the Virginia Attorney General chooses to take
legal action against an entity, the entity’s data controller has 30 days to
either cure the violation and provide the Attorney General with a
written statement that the breach has been fixed.266 If an entity selects
not to cure a violation, the Virginia Attorney General may fine the
entity up to $7,500 per violation.267

258

Rippy, supra note 247.
Id.
260 Id.
261 Id.
262 Id.
263 Id.
264 Id.
265 Id.
266 Id.
267 Id.
259

2022]

SHOULD PERSONAL INFORMATION
F.

73

Colorado’s Privacy Act

On July 8, 2021, the Colorado Privacy Act (CPA) officially
became law.268 According to Rippy, the CPA is similar to the CCPA
and the CDPA but with some distinct differences.269 The CPA pertains
to any controller that conducts business in Colorado, produces products
or services for Colorado residents, controls data for at least 100,000
customers annually, or obtains revenue or a discount on the price of
goods or services from selling personal customer data.270 According to
the CPA, there are no revenue minimums, but the law does concern
companies that process the personal information of 25,000 or more
customers and gets revenue or a discount from the sale of that data. 271
Also, the CPA defined a consumer as a Colorado resident that acts as
an individual or in the context of a household but omitted peopled
acting in a commercial or employment context such as a job
applicant.272
The CPA defines a sale of personal information as an exchange
of personal data for money or other valuable consideration.273
However, a sale does not include the (1) disclosure of personal data to
a processor that processes personal data for the processor, (2)
disclosure of personal data to a third party for delivering a product or
service that a consumer asks for, (3) disclosure or transfer of personal
data to a controller’s affiliate, (4) disclosure or transfer of personal data
that is part of a merger or bankruptcy, or (5) disclosure of personal data
where the controller is directed by the consumer to make the personal
data available to a third party or the general public.274
The CPA excuses the entity-level exemptions and data-level
exemptions.275 For example, an entity-level exemption would consist
of entities that are subject to the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, but did not
fully exempt entities that are covered by the Health Insurance
Portability and Accountability Act (HIPPA).276 Furthermore, under the
CPA, the six primary consumer rights include the right of access, the
right to correct data inaccuracies, the right to delete personal data, the
right to obtain personal information in a portable format, the right to
268
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opt-out of processing of personal customer data, and the right to appeal
with a reasonable time when a business denies a customer’s request.277
The law demands that the Colorado attorney general establish technical
standards before July 1, 2023.278
A data controller has the duty (1) to expressly specify why
personal information is being collected, (20 to avoid the secondary use
of personal data, (3) of care that is appropriate to the volume, scope,
and nature of the personal information being collected, (4) to avoid
unlawful discrimination, (5) to avert processing sensitive data without
customer consent, (6) to assess whether a data processing activity
presents a heightened risk of harm to a consumer; and (7) to require
that a processor be governed by a contract between a controller and a
processor.279 Unlike the other privacy acts discussed above, the CPA
gave the attorney general and district attorneys the authority to enforce
the Colorado privacy law.280 Once legal action is initiated, a controller
has 60 to cure a violation, which is twice the time allotted by the
California and Virginia cure period.281 The 60-day cure period will
cease beginning January 1, 2025.282 There are no penalties in the CPA
because a violation of the law is considered to be deceptive trade
practice, where the Colorado Consumer Protection Act ensures that the
maximum is $20,000 per violation.283
G.

Status of Privacy Bills in the Several States

As one can see from the discussion above, there are as of this
writing five states, California, Nevada, Maine, Virginia, and Colorado,
that have passed privacy laws. According to Rippy, six states are
currently in the process of legislating privacy laws.284 Also, sixteen
states have had privacy bills that failed to be passed by their respective
legislatures.285 By implication, as of September 1, 2021, the legislatures
of 23 states are not currently considering a privacy bill. This
information implies that privacy legislation may be quickly becoming
a serious issue in the United States.
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BIOMETRIC PRIVACY LAWS IN THE SEVERAL STATES

In this section of this essay, Illinois’ Biometric Information
Privacy Act, Texas’ Capture or Use of Biometric Identifier Act, and
Washington’s Biometric Identifiers Act will be discussed in turn. The
states with minor changes in existing law to accommodate the
protection of biometric identifiers and states where biometric privacy
bills are under legislative review will also be examined.
A.

Illinois’ Biometric Information Privacy Act

In 2008, the Biometric Information Privacy Act became law in
the State of Illinois. It was a comprehensive law that more or less laid
dormant until the Illinois Supreme Court opined in Rosenbach.286 An
example of a case involving BIPA before Rosenbach is Rivera. The
Court held that Google’s retention of unique face templates did not
cause the type of concrete injury to individuals required to establish
standing.287 The Court observed that Google, Inc.’s creation, without
consent, of unique face templates did not cause a concrete injury as
required for standing.288 Thus, there was no BIPA violation.
With the Illinois Supreme Court’s decision in Rosenbach, a
proliferation of cases occurred.289 Rosenbach originated when a
fourteen-year-old boy, Alexander Rosenbach, went on a field trip to
Six Flags Great America in Gurnee, Illinois.290 His mother, Stacy
Rosenbach, purchased a ticket for her son online.291 When entering Six
Flags, Alexander was required to scan his thumbprint to verify his
identity and activate his season pass.292 Alexander did not receive any
paperwork describing either the reasons for why the thumbprint scan
was taken or how the biometric data would be stored, used, or
disseminated.293 When Alexander returned home, he told his mother
about the scan print.294 Six Flags did not send Alexander or his mother
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a consent form regarding taking a scan of Alexander’s thumbprint. 295
Six Flags did not reveal its policy regarding its biometric information
storage policies to the plaintiffs.296
In Rosenbach, the Court reversed the appellate court’s ruling,
finding a technical violation of BIPA. There was no showing of actual
damages in the lower court that gave rise to a cause of action. 297
However, the Court employed the statute's plain meaning to opine that
a plaintiff’s standing under BIPA is not controlled by actual harm but
rather by an invasion and infringement of a statutory right, which in
turn gave rise to the cause of action.298 The decision of the Court was
unanimous.299
Rosenbach resulted in an increase in biometric litigation in
Illinois.300 In Rogers, the plaintiffs were an “aggrieved person” within
the meaning of BIPA.301 The plaintiffs adequately stated a claim for
violations of the Illinois law.302 However, the plaintiffs failed to allege
that the defendant’s actions were intentional and reckless, as required
for heightened damages.303 In Namuwonge, the plaintiffs sufficiently
alleged that Kronos, Inc. possessed fingerprint data collected by the
company within the meaning of BIPA.304 The plaintiffs stated a claim
against Kronos for the violation of BIPA that required Kronos to
develop a written policy when in possession of biometric identifiers.305
The plaintiffs did not state a claim against Kronos for a violation of
BIPA, which limited transfers of biometric information. 306 The
plaintiffs did not state a claim against Kronos, Inc. for a violation of
BIPA that required a company collecting or capturing a person’s
biometric information to inform the individual in writing.307 Finally,
295
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the plaintiffs’ abstract statements regarding damages were insufficient
for the federal district court to infer that the company acted recklessly
or intentionally.308
In Bryant, the Seventh Circuit ruled that the collection of
customer fingerprints without first obtaining written consent, which
BIPA required, was an injury that was sufficient to satisfy the injuryin-fact requirement for standing.309 According to the Court, the failure
to disclose a written retention schedule and destruction guidelines
publicly violated BIPA, whereas no injury was sufficient to confer
standing before collecting fingerprints.310
In Snider, Snider had the standing to bring BIPA claims for
Heartland Beef’s failure to inform and failure to obtain written
consent.311 However, Snider lacked standing to assert a claim that
Heartland Beef was unable to create and publicize its policy regarding
retention and destruction of its biometric identifiers defense.312 The
Illinois Workers’ Compensation Act did not preempt Snider’s BIPA
claims because Snider pled a plausible BIPA claim against the
Heartland Beef defense.313 Finally, Snider sufficiently alleged
Heartland Beef’s negligence, where an implied assumption of risk was
not an applicable defense.314 In Campbell, the Ninth Circuit opined that
the plaintiffs in the class-action suit had sufficiently alleged concrete
injury-in-fact to satisfy standing.315 The federal district court did not
abuse its discretion when it determined that class certification’s
predominant requirement was met.316 Finally, the federal district court
did not abuse its discretion when it opined that class certification’s
superiority requirement was met.317
In Fox, the Seventh Circuit held that the federal district court’s
remand order back to state court was appealable.318 Dakkota Integrated
Systems’ alleged violation of BIPA was an injury-in-fact that
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supported Fox’s claim for standing under Article III. 319 The alleged
violation consisted of failing to develop, publicly disclose, and comply
with a data-retention schedule and guidelines for the permanent
destruction of biometric data after the initial purpose for collection
ended.320
In Figueroa, the plaintiffs sufficiently alleged a concrete
informational injury to confer Article III standing.321 Kronos was
obliged to obtain a written release from its employees before acquiring
biometric data.322 The plaintiffs claimed that Kronos violated the BIPA
section that required private organizations who obtained biometric data
to inform its employees that the company was collecting biometric data
without receiving a written release.323 The Court noted that Kronos
disseminated employee biometric data without the plaintiffs’
knowledge or consent.324 The plaintiffs adequately alleged negligence
required to state a claim for statutory damages under BIPA.325 Finally,
potential fact questions concerning various timekeeping practices of
Kronos did not warrant striking the class allegations at the pleading
stage.326 It was premature at the pleading stage to strike class
allegations based on the vendor’s claim that named plaintiffs were
inadequate class representatives.327
In Cothron, the plaintiffs’ alleged injury was caused by White
Castle’s violation of BIPA, which requires an organization, before
collecting biometric data, to inform an employee in writing that the
information is being collected or stored.328 The organization must also
state the specific purpose and length of term for collecting, storing, and
using the data.329 An employer must receive a written release from the
individual.330 In other words, the plaintiffs had Article III standing. 331
The plaintiffs did not allege a violation or suffer an injury under BIPA
that required the defendant that possessed the biometric data to delete
319
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that data as soon as the purpose of the collection was satisfied or within
three years after the last interaction with the relevant person. 332 This
meant that the plaintiffs did not have Article III standing to bring a
claim based on this provision of BIPA.333
The plaintiffs’ alleged injury, which was caused by the
defendant’s violation of a provision of BIPA that states that an
organization in possession of biometric data may only disclose or
otherwise disseminate an individual’s data on obtaining the person’s
consent or in limited other circumstances, was concrete and
particularized.334 This means that the plaintiffs possess Article III
standing to sue for such alleged violation.335 The consent form that the
plaintiffs signed did not equitably estop the plaintiffs, under Illinois
law, from bringing this action.336 The plaintiffs’ failure to specifically
allege the defendant’s mental state did not require dismissal.337 It did
not matter the time at which consent was statutorily required under the
provision of BIPA, which states that an organization that possesses
biometric data may only disclose or otherwise disseminate a person’s
data upon obtaining the person’s consent or in limited other
circumstances.338 The plaintiffs pleaded information that triggered his
or her suspicion of disseminating their biometric data without
consent.339 Thus, the plaintiffs stated a plausible claim, even though
some of the allegations were alleged upon information and belief.340
In Sherman, the plaintiffs alleged a concrete injury sufficient to
establish Article III standing because Brandt Industries failed to
institute, maintain, and adhere to a publicly available retention
schedule and failed to obtain informed written consent before
collecting biometric information.341 The plaintiffs could seek
liquidated damages under BIPA.342 The Illinois Workers’
Compensation Act did not preempt the plaintiffs’ suit.343
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Finally, in Thornley, the defendant collected Thornley’s
biometric data via photographs and metadata that were procured using
social media websites such as Facebook, Venmo, and YouTube.344
Clearview proceeded to compile the biometric data and then sold it to
third parties.345 Thornley contended that Clearview violated Section
15(c) of BIPA, prohibiting private organizations from selling, leasing,
trading, or profiting from an individual’s biometric identifiers.346 The
Seventh Circuit opined that Thornley did not experience an Article III
injury from the sale of his biometric data.347 The Court concluded that
by ensuring that the supply of biometric identifiers is illegal, Section
15(c) prevented a market for biometric identifiers from existing.348 The
Court likened Section 15(c) to Section 15(a), which prohibited entities
from collecting biometric identifiers without issuing data retention and
destruction policies.349 In other words, a defendant owed a duty to the
public-at-large rather than to an individual plaintiff, absent a positive
allegation of a specific injury.350
B.

Texas’ Capture or Use of Biometric Identifier Act

In 2009, one year after BIPA was passed, the Texas legislature
passed Chapter 503 of Title 11, Subtitle A as amended, the Texas
biometric privacy law, also known as the Capture or Use of Biometric
Identifier (CUBI) Act.351 The law is approximately one and one-half
pages long.352 The law protects the confidentiality of biometric
identifiers by restricting their collection, sale, lease, or disclosure but
does not contain a broader definition of biometric information.353
344
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According to Section 503.001, a biometric identifier means a retina or
iris scan, fingerprint, voiceprint, or a record of the geometry of a face
or hand.354 The Texas law does not cover a voiceprint if a financial
institution or an affiliate retains it because 15 U.S.C. Section 6809
defines those terms.355 CUBI does not require a written release, but
does demand that firms destroy data that are no longer needed, and
compels businesses to destroy that data “no later than the first
anniversary of the data the purpose for collecting the identifier expires,
except as provided by Subsection (c-1)”.356 CUBI does not permit a
private cause of action but only allows the Texas Attorney General to
begin legal proceedings.357
C.

Washington’s Biometric Identifiers Act

On July 23, 2017, Washington became the third state to pass a
biometric privacy law called the Biometric Identifiers Act (BIA).358
Under the Washington law, a biometric identifier is similar to the Texas
definition of a biometric identifier, but BIA does not possess an express
definition of biometric information.359 In contrast to BIPA and CUBI,
the Washington law does have a security clause where biometric
identifiers may be collected for the purpose of “preventing shoplifting,
fraud, or any other misappropriation or theft of a thing of value,
including tangible and intangible goods, services, and other purposes
in furtherance of protecting the security or integrity of software,
accounts, applications, online services, or any person.”360
Like Texas, the BIA does not require that consent be in writing,
nor does the law create a private cause of action, but only permits the
Washington Attorney General to instigate legal proceedings.361 Finally,
the Washington biometric privacy law does allow businesses to sell
biometric identifiers except under seven specific circumstances that,
under a careful reading, appear to subsume the rule.362
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Amendments to Existing Arkansas and New York State

Laws
Zych and his colleagues wrote that on August 9, 2019,
Arkansas amended its definition of the personal information contained
in its data breach response law to encompass biometric data, such as
voiceprint, handprint, fingerprint, DNA, a retina or iris scan, hand
geometry, faceprint, or another unique biological characteristic. 363
Accordingly, Arkansas businesses that acquire, own, or license
personal information are now required to implement and maintain
“reasonable and appropriate security practices to protect data from
unauthorized access or disclosure.”364 In February 2020, the State of
New York revised its definition of personal information in its Stop
Hacks and Improve Electronic Data Security Act to include biometric
data that may be employed to authenticate or ascertain a person’s
identity.365
E.
Maryland

Pending Biometric Privacy Bills in New York and

According to Lust and his colleagues, on January 6, 2021, the
first day of the New York legislature’s 2021 session, New York state
representatives proposed Assembly Bill 27 (AB 27), the New York
Biometric Privacy Act.366They reported that the bill’s purpose is to
ensure that companies have a written biometric retention policy.367 The
bill would require that non-governmental organizations with biometric
information generate a written retention policy that specifies the initial
purpose of acquiring personal information and when this purpose has
been satisfied.368 According to the New York bill, a private entity must
destroy that biometric information within three years of last interacting
with an individual.369
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Shortly after New York state representatives proposed
Assembly Bill 27 (AB 27), Maryland introduced House Bill 218, a bill
that seemingly cloned the Illinois Biometric Privacy Act.370 Like
Illinois’ BIPA, the Maryland bill assures that individuals have a private
right of action, statutory penalties and that plaintiffs can recover
attorney fees when the litigation is successful.371 Given the tidal wave
of class action suits in Illinois, the modeling of Maryland’s biometric
bill on Illinois’ BIPA demonstrates that Maryland employers must
scrutinize biometric technology and litigation to avoid possible class
action suits in the future.372
The Maryland bill title is entitled “Commercial Law –
Consumer Protection – Biometric Identifiers and Biometric
Information Privacy.”373 The Maryland bill forbids private
organizations from capturing, collecting, or storing an individual’s
biometric information without first having a biometric policy
document and acquiring written consent, implements standards of care,
and prohibits biometric information disclosure without consent.374
Under the Maryland bill, the available remedies are similar to the
remedies contained in Illinois’ BIPA.375 An individual can recover
$1,000 for each negligent violation and $5,00 for each intentional or
reckless violation, including reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs.376
The difference between Illinois’ BIPA and the Maryland bill is
that biometric identifiers under the Maryland law extend to data about
an individual that is created by automatic measurements of that
person’s biological characteristics, including fingerprints, genetic
print, iris, or retina scan, voiceprint, etc.377 The Maryland bill possesses
a broader definition of biometric information.378 It includes any
information that can be used to identify an individual, regardless of
how it is obtained, converted, stored, or shared.379 However, under the
370
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Maryland bill, biometric information does not include any information
that is excluded under its definition of a biometric identifier, such as
photographs, information captured from a health care setting,
operations, payment, or treatment under HIPAA.380 Finally, under the
Maryland bill, a company’s policy regarding the retention and
destruction of biometric information does not need to see the light of
day if the policy applies only to the employees of a private organization
and is employed only for internal use.381 If Maryland passes its
biometric privacy bill, it remains to be seen whether Maryland will
experience a similar cascade of class action suits like those currently
being filed in Illinois.382
Finally, based on the experiences of Illinois’ BIPA and the New
York and Maryland legislators, it can be expected that other states may
soon follow the lead of Illinois, New York, and Maryland.
F.

Summary of the Literature Reviewed

The first privacy test originated in Justice Harlan’s concurrence
in Katz.383 The General Data Protection Regulation became law in
2018.384 It is a comprehensive law that includes biometric privacy. The
principal case that tested the EU Directive was Costeja González.385
The CJEU held that Google Spain and Google, Inc. must eradicate links
to web pages that are freely accessible worldwide when individuals
whose personal information is contained therein demand that the links
be removed.386 For the United States, the California Consumer Privacy
Act is a comprehensive privacy law as amended by the California
Privacy Rights Act.387 Several states are creating their versions of the
CCPA, much like how the Virginia law was modeled after the CCPA
as amended.388 Currently, there is no comprehensive federal privacy
law in the United States.389
The first state in the United States to pass a comprehensive
biometric privacy law was Illinois.390 The law was entitled the
380
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Biometric Information Privacy Act (BIPA).391 One of the consequences
of BIPA has been a tidal wave of suits because BIPA permits private
action rather than limiting actions to be filed only by the Illinois
Attorney General.392 Texas and Washington have their biometric
privacy law versions, but the laws in these states are by no means as
all-inclusive as the Illinois law.393 Arkansas and New York recently
amended their existing state laws to protect biometric information. 394
Finally, as of this writing, the legislatures of both New York and
Maryland are in the process of evaluating their renderings of biometric
privacy law.395
V.

DISCUSSION OF THE FINDINGS

The purpose of this study was to understand and evaluate the
privacy and property issues that states confront that are inherent from
the use of biometrics to enhance corporate security in their efforts to
protect individual privacy. The research examined the historical legal
foundations of privacy, focusing on the GDPR, the CCPA as amended
by the CPRA, and Illinois’ BIPA. The research also discussed the
existing privacy and biometric privacy laws by indicating the states
where privacy and biometric privacy legislation are under review by
various state legislatures. The research addressed the following
questions: (1) What are the biometric privacy issues that states face
regarding individual and corporate needs for security and privacy?; (2)
Why do several states continue to be vulnerable to litigation regarding
biometric privacy issues?; (3) How does the State of Illinois address
biometric privacy issues in its statutory effort to protect the individuals
against organizations that employ biometric cybersecurity
procedures?; and (4) How does the Illinois Biometric Information
Privacy Act benefit the federal government and other states in their
efforts to create and pass biometric privacy laws that protect the
privacy rights of their citizens?
The research described the history of privacy, why it is
important, and what harms individuals experience when their privacy
is violated. The research also described the content of the GDPR and
the content of the CCPA as amended by the CPRA. The study outlined
Illinois’ BIPA, explaining what biometric information is and what it is
not. Finally, the essay delineated the privacy and biometric privacy
laws in other states and indicated what states were in the process of
391
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evaluating bills that specifically addressed privacy and biometric
privacy.
A.

Individual and Corporate Privacy Needs

The fundamental issue that states face regarding individual and
corporate needs for security and privacy is how to protect the
confidentiality of personal information while ensuring that entities
employ their tools appropriately to safeguard corporate tangible and
intangible property. In the United States, individuals have a legally
recognized reasonable expectation of privacy and specific privacy
rights by statute.396 Companies should not be able to buy or sell
individual personal information without expressed prior consent. On
the other hand, companies need to ensure that their tangible and
intangible property is safe from individuals who may misappropriate
or misuse corporate assets. Like in Rosenbach, firms need to make
sure that customers only receive the goods and services they pay for
and not for biometric data collection.397 Once an organization collects
personal data, an entity is responsible for ensuring that the personal
information is held in privity and not accessible to unauthorized third
parties.
B.

Vulnerabilities to Litigation

There are several reasons why states are vulnerable to litigation
regarding privacy in general and biometric privacy in particular. For
states that have not passed privacy or biometric privacy legislation such
as the CCPA or Illinois’ BIPA, the following four distinct privacy torts
described by Prosser are the unreasonable intrusion upon another’s
seclusion, public disclosure of private facts, false light invasion of
privacy, and appropriation of another’s name or likeness.398 These torts
are available for litigants whether the privacy issue at hand deals with
personal information or biometric information. For the states that have
passed privacy or biometric privacy laws, any vulnerabilities to
litigation are expressed in the respective statutes. In particular, for
Illinois under BIPA, individuals have the legal right to instigate private

396
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action.399 In contrast, only the Attorneys General of the respective
states can sue private entities in Texas and Washington.400
C.

Protecting Individual Biometric Privacy

Illinois addresses biometric privacy issues in multiple ways.
First, BIPA explicitly defines biometric information as physiological
characteristics related to the shape of the body, such as fingerprints,
palm veins, face recognition, DNA, palm prints, hand geometry, iris
recognition, retina, and odor or scent.401 BIPA also states what is not
biometric information, such as writing samples, photographs, tattoos,
height, weight, hair color, X-rays, or mammography.402 Second,
Illinois’ BIPA through Rosenbach showed that a plaintiff does not have
to experience actual damages to sue a defendant to establish a BIPA
violation.403 Finally, instead of giving only a State’s Attorney General
the legal authority to sue an entity, such as in Texas and Washington,
Illinois permits private action.404
D.

Biometric Privacy and the Federal Government

Based on the research above, it is apparent that the CCPA, as
amended by the CPRA, is currently the model privacy law in the United
States. It is also evident that Illinois’ BIPA is the model biometric
privacy law in the country. Both the CCPA, as amended by the CPRA,
and BIPA are extensive pieces of legislation that precisely define an
individual’s privacy and biometric privacy rights. A significant
limitation of both laws is that the content of the CCPA as amended by
the CPRA does not overlap with the content of Illinois’ BIPA. Unlike
Article 14(4) of the GDPR, which explicitly covers both Internet and
computer-based privacy rights as well as biometric privacy rights.405 In
the text that follows, it is argued that what is needed in the United States
is a comprehensive privacy law, much like the GDPR, but tuned to the
399
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political nuances that exist in America. To this end, the CCPA, as
amended by the CPRA and Illinois’ BIPA, can be employed in the
development and passage by Congress of an inclusive and far-reaching
federal privacy law.
E.

Recommendations
1.

First Recommendation

Here are some of the recommendations that come out of the
research discussed above. First and foremost is the need for a federal
privacy law, much like the CCPA as amended by the CPRA,
encompassing biometric privacy. The critical issue is who owns the
data collected when an individual provides their data to a corporation
or local, state, or federal government. In the law, a person only
possesses a reasonable expectation of privacy as defined by Supreme
Court case law and by specific statutes, such as the Americans with
Disability Act.406 In Carpenter and the preceding cases discussed
herein, individuals have a reasonable expectation of privacy when the
local, state, and federal government access an individual’s cell phone
metadata.407 There were four distinct minority opinions in Carpenter,
three of whom contended that there is no privacy without property
rights.408 In Justice Gorsuch’s dissent, he opined that cell phone
providers, the organizations that collect, store, use, and disseminate cell
phone metadata, are bailees entrusted by the cell phone owners with
the metadata generated by the cell phones that the cell phone owners
own.409
What is apparent from the case law is that the reasonable
expectation of privacy test and the notion that privacy can only exist
when property rights are present are antithetical. The first
recommendation of this essay is that synthesis must occur, merging
one’s reasonable expectation of privacy and the privacy is property
notion into a cohesive whole so that individual privacy is protected by
law. Dialectical reasoning must be employed to achieve this goal,
blending the reasonable expectation of privacy thesis and the privacy
as property antithesis, creating the synthesis as implied in Justice
Gorsuch’s dissent in Carpenter, where the entities that collect, store,
use, and disseminate personal information are bailees.410 Once this is
406
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achieved, biometric privacy loses its importance as an issue in itself but
is transformed into a special case of privacy rights in general.
2.

Second Recommendation

The second and succeeding recommendations address the
mechanics of how a federal privacy law should and ought to function.
What is covered under the proposed federal privacy law, and probably
more importantly, what is not covered, must be stated explicitly in the
proposed rule and not left to the courts’ discretion. Presuming that a
federal privacy law encompasses biometric privacy, a proposed federal
privacy law, like BIPA, should and ought to explicitly state what
personal information is protected and what is not. For example, under
BIPA, fingerprints, palm veins, face recognition, DNA, palm prints,
hand geometry, iris recognition, retina, and odor or scent are all
physiological characteristics that are protected.411 Behavioral factors
associated with behavior patterns, including typing rhythm, gait,
keystroke, signature, behavioral profiling, and voice, are also protected
under BIPA.412
The Biometric Information Privacy Act states that biometric
information is not “writing samples, written signatures, photographs,
human biological samples used for valid scientific testing or screening,
demographic data, tattoo descriptions, or physical descriptions such as
height, weight, hair color, or eye color.” 413 Biometric information is
also not “donated organs, tissues, or parts, … blood or serum stored on
behalf of recipients or potential recipients of living or cadaveric
transplants and obtained or stored by a federally designated organ
procurement agency.”414 Biometric identifiers are not regulated
biological materials (specifically, in Illinois, the Genetic Information
Privacy Act of 2020), information captured from a patient in a health
care setting, or information collected, used, or stored for health care
treatment, payment, or operations under the federal Health Insurance
Portability and Accountability Act.415 Finally, biometric identifiers do
not involve “an X-ray, roentgen process, computed tomography, MRI,
PET scan, mammography, or other image or film of the human
411
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anatomy used to diagnose, prognose, or treat an illness or other medical
condition or to further validate scientific testing or screening
agency.”416
Illinois’ BIPA is quite specific to what constitutes protected
biometric information and what information about an individual is not
covered. When passing a federal privacy law, it can be expected that
legislators will engage in considerable wrangling about what to protect
and what not to protect. Such negotiations are an integral part of the
negotiation process in voting on a bill to make a law. It is reasonable
to expect that such infighting will naturally occur. Although there is a
case to be made for the proposed federal law to contain a general
definition of personal information, leaving the particulars up to the
courts to decide, the risk of having a general definition of what
constitutes protected personal information, biometric or otherwise, is
that the Supreme Court could rule that the proposed federal privacy law
is unconstitutional for vagueness. Thus, the second recommendation is
that the proposed federal privacy law specifically describe what is and
what is not protected personal and biometric information.
3.

Third Recommendation

When a violation occurs of the proposed federal privacy law,
damages need to be considered. Currently, in Illinois, when a technical
breach of BIPA happens, Illinois courts cite Rosenbach to conclude
that there is sufficient support for a cause of action, even if an
individual has not experienced a loss of biometric privacy. 417 When
considering a proposed federal privacy law, the mere presence of a
violation could trigger the law, or the law could be invoked when a
third party uses personal information for nefarious, presumably illegal
ends. This is a difficult question to answer. If the proposed federal
privacy law advocates the former, then the consequences may have a
significant negative economic impact not foreseen by Congress. On the
other hand, if the latter is contained in the proposed federal privacy law,
there may be many instances where common sense privacy violations
materialize without a legal remedy. Thus, the third recommendation is
that a balancing test should be created where an offense transpires only
when the harm to an individual outweighs the effect of a technical
violation.
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Fourth Recommendation

Next, there is the issue of damages to be addressed. The CCPA
specifies two types of non-compliance penalties. According to the
CCPA, the damages are at most $750 per violation or the actual
damages, whatever is the greater amount.418 The Attorney General of
California may enforce the privacy provision of the CCPA via civil
penalties with a maximum of $7,500 per violation.419 For example, it is
not uncommon for a data breach to involve one million individuals. At
$750 per violation, the maximum penalty would be $750 million,
whereas if the Attorney General of California decides to sue the entity,
the maximum penalty would be $7.5 billion.420 The problem with the
massive amount of money that the federal government could extract
from a private organization is that few entities could afford to pay the
fine and remain in existence. It is quite possible that in the presence of
such huge fines, a company would simply declare Chapter 7
bankruptcy. The result would be putting tens of thousands of
employees out of work, if not hundreds of thousands. It is apparent that
if the proposed federal privacy law were to follow the CCPA’s
example, one of the economic consequences could be a downturn in
the economy or even a recession. Thus, the fourth recommendation is
that the proposed federal privacy law employ a sliding scale of
damages, where the penalty is directly proportional to the number of
individual violations.
5.

Final Recommendation

The final recommendation deals with the volume of individual
and class action suits that could be filed with the passage of federal
privacy law. As was previously observed, the Illinois Supreme Court’s
decision in Rosenbach generated a tidal wave of cases because BIPA
permits private action.421 In contrast, only the states’ Attorneys General
can begin legal proceedings in both Texas and Washington. Given that
the Texas and Washington biometric privacy laws were passed several
years after Illinois’ BIPA was signed into law, the probable reason that
Texas and Washington allow only their Attorneys General to instigate
legal proceedings is that the respective state legislators do not want to
clog their state judiciary systems with a host of private actions, like
what is happening in Illinois. Private action is critical because, without
the ability of individuals to sue an offending entity, the proposed
418
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federal privacy law would be a toothless tiger. Suppose individuals
must rely exclusively on a federal agency to sue an offending
organization. In general, given the limited resources of federal
agencies, there is a distinctly significant probability that the proposed
federal agency will decide not to pursue litigation, thereby denying
justice to aggrieved persons. This would be an untenable situation,
leaving wronged individuals without an adequate legal remedy from a
civil rights perspective. Thus, a balance must be struck between
individual rights of redress and judicial efficiency.
One such solution has its roots in the Civil Rights Act of 1964,
as amended, and the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission.422
It is proposed that the proposed federal privacy law establish a
commission responsible for evaluating whether litigation will be filed
against an organization that violated an individual’s privacy or
biometric privacy rights. An individual or a class of individuals could
file a complaint with this commission, claiming that a private
organization violated an individual’s or class of individuals’ privacy
rights. It is suggested that the commission have 180 days to evaluate
whether it will sue the offending entity.
At the end of the 180 days, the commission would release a
right-to-sue letter to the complainants(s) if the commission decided not
to sue. The claimant(s) would then have 540 days after receiving the
right to sue letter to file suit against the offending organization. The
statute of limitations would start running for individual lawsuits after
the person became knowingly aware that the privacy violation
occurred. The statute of limitations for a class action would begin after
the class’s principal representative became knowingly aware that the
privacy violations happened. This final recommendation seemingly
balances the rights of individuals to pursue private actions against
offending organizations and the likely desire of Congress to ensure that
the federal court system is not overly burdened with privacy litigation.
F.

Summary

This research summarized the privacy and biometric privacy
laws both in the European Union and the United States. The project
observed that the United States sorely lacks a federal privacy law that
encompasses the handling by companies of personal information and
biometric information. It was proposed that the United States pass an
all-inclusive privacy law that would act as a floor to the state privacy
laws that currently exist and to the privacy bills being considered by
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the legislatures of the several states. Here, the research answered the
questions proposed at the beginning of the article. The paper also listed
five recommendations that should be considered if and when Congress
decides to enact a broad privacy statute. It seems that privacy is
becoming a burning issue in America, and that is a good thing.
CONCLUSION
In 1964, Bob Dylan, an iconic folk singer, wrote and recorded
the song, The Times They Are a-Changin’.423 It was a song about the
turmoil that was altering the face of America in the 1960s. In 2021, in
terms of privacy and biometric privacy, the times are also changing,
and rapidly at that. Three states have passed general privacy laws
protecting personal information, while three other states now have
statutes regarding protecting biometric data privacy. Many states are
currently considering bills that address the privacy concerns of their
constituents. With all of this activity regarding privacy at the state
level, what is conspicuous by its absence is a comprehensive federal
privacy law that addresses protecting individual personal information
and safeguards the privacy of a person’s biometric information.
The purpose of this study was to understand and evaluate the
privacy and property issues that States confront that are inherent within
the use and results of using biometrics to enhance corporate security in
their efforts to protect individual privacy. The recommendations from
this research indicated that what is needed in the United States is a
comprehensive privacy statute that protects personal information and
biometric information. The CCPA, as amended by the CPRA, and
Illinois’ BIPA, can form the basis of a model federal law. Although the
path traveled to reach this destination is fraught with crossroads, forks
in the road, and the ever-present obstacles, the goal is worth pursuing.
For, in the end, the journey will be worth the struggle. Americans want
and need a privacy law, for they are the owners of their personal and
biometric information, just as Justice Gorsuch opined in Carpenter.
The world is rapidly changing, and what is all the rage today may be
abandoned tomorrow. An inclusive and far-reaching federal privacy
law is essential to protect the privacy rights of American citizens.
Nothing less will suffice.
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